Illegal Search and Seizure by State Officers as Affecting Admissibility of the Evidence in Federal Prosecutions by Margolin, Abraham E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 1 
January 1928 
Illegal Search and Seizure by State Officers as Affecting 
Admissibility of the Evidence in Federal Prosecutions 
Abraham E. Margolin 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abraham E. Margolin, Illegal Search and Seizure by State Officers as Affecting Admissibility of the 
Evidence in Federal Prosecutions, 14 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 049 (1928). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
CARL WHEATON, who contributes JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES'
COURTS IN ACTIONS OF ATTACHMENT IN THE CITY OF ST.
Louis, is Professor of Law at St. Louis University School of
Law and has taught at a number of other law schools. He
is the editor of a volume of cases on Federal Procedure and
has written several other legal articles.
ROBERT L. ARONSON, a member of the St. Louis bar, is the
winner in the Class of 1928 of both the alumni prize for
highest average in scholarship during the law course and of
the prize for the best thesis written by a member of his
Class. His thesis is reproduced in the article, WOULD A
STATUTE PROVIDING FOR THE WAIVER OF A JURY IN FELONY
CASES BE CONSTITUTIONAL IN MISSOURI? Mr. Aronson was
a member of the LAW REVIEW staff from 1926 to 1928.
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY STATE OFFICERS
AS AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
IN FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS
The growing policy among United States attorneys of basing
their prohibition prosecutions on evidence secured by municipal
officers gives the recent case of Gambino v. United States" an
especial significance. In it the Supreme Court of the United
States seems to have injected into the Federal rule barring evi-
dence obtained in contravention to the fourth and fifth amend-
ments of the Constitution a note as fully inharmonious with the
trend of its recent decisions2 as it did when it handed down the
opinion in Boyd v. United States8 which enunciated, subject to
limitations laid down in succeeding cases,4 what has been be-
lieved to be the present rule on the proposition.
Prior to the Boyd case practically all American courts had
proceeded on the philosophy that the object of evidence is to
elicit truth, concluding that the probative value of any evi-
dentiary fact was not in any wise affected by the manner or the
1 (1927), 72 L. Ed., 139, 48 S. Ct. 139.
'Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U. S. 385, 392,
64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182; Rowan v. United States (1923), 260 U. S. 721,
67 L. Ed. 481, 43 S. Ct. 12.
3 (1885), 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 S. Ct. 524.
'If defendant would have the evidence excluded he must file a petition
before trial for its suppression. Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U. S.
388, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341, L. R. A. 1915B 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1177.
The exception to this rule is found where the defendant has only learned
that the search was illegal at or immediately before the trial, and there has
been no opportunity to file a petition for the return of the articles seized.
Gouled v. United States (1920), 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261.
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means in which it was obtained and that only the credibility
would be affected by the mode of the acquisition. Since the
Boyd case the United States courts have uniformly barred evi-
dence seized illegally by Federal officers so long as the defendant
has followed the proper procedure in having the evidence sup-
pressed.6 And as a corollary to that rule Federal courts uni-
formly have admitted evidence seized illegally so long as the
seizure was not made by officers of the United States Govern-
ment.7
But in the Gambino case the Supreme Court held it to be re-
versible error because the trial judge, in a prosecution under the
Volstead Act, did not exclude evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal arrest, search, and seizure on the part of police officers of
the State of New York. The facts of the case, briefly, follow.
The defendants, Gambino and Lima, were arrested by two New
York State troopers near the Canadian border; their auto was
searched without a warrant; and intoxicating liquor found
therein was seized. The men, the liquor, and other property
taken were immediately turned over to Federal authorities. The
defendants moved seasonably, in advance of the trial and again
later, for the suppression of the liquor as evidence and for its re-
turn on the ground that the arrest and seizure violated the
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments of the Federal Constitution.
The motion was denied; the evidence was introduced at the
trial; and the defendants were found guilty and sentenced. The
result of the appeal has been indicated.
It should be noted that about nine months prior to this arrest
and seizure the Mullan-Gage Law, the State prohibition act, had
been repealed.8 Consequently the state troopers were not seek-
ing to enforce any state law in seizing the liquor. But Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis points out the New York Governor, in approving
the Act which repealed the state dry-law, declared that all peace
officers would be required to aid in the enforcement of the Vol-
'Stockwell v. United States (1870), 3 Cliff. 284, Fed. Cas. No. 13,466;
United States v. Hughes (1875), 12 Blatchf. 553, Fed. Cas. No. 15,417;
United States v. Three Tons of Coal (1875), 6 Biss. 379, Fed. Cas. No.
16,515; Blackstone, COMMENTARIES, Book 3, p. 256.
" See footnote 4, supra.
'Twining v. New Jersey (1908), 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. Ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14;
United States v. Falloco (1922), 277 F. 75.
" From the margin of the report: "Immediately after the repeal of the
Mullan-Gage law the Federal Prohibition Director in New York City an.
nounced that he would call upon the Superintendent of State troopers, the
sheriff of each county, and every chief of police to aid in arresting vio-
lators of the National Prohibition Act. In February, 1924, he attended a
conference of State and Federal enforcement agencies at Albany, where he
reiterated the need for cooperation. . . Arrests for violation were com-
monly made by the State troopers. ."
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stead Act "with as much force and as much vigor as they would
enforce any state law or local ordinance." Therefore he holds
that when the Federal officials accepted the aid which was given
as a result it became subject to the rules of exclusion applicable
to evidence seized by Federal officers. However, the learned
judge ruled expressly that although the State troopers were
peace officers of the State, they "were not, at the time of the ar-
rest and seizure, agents of the United States." 9
The statement is made in the opinion that "The conclusion
here reached is not in conflict with any of the earlier decisions of
this court. . . ." Therefore, it is legitimate to examine the
rule of the Gambino case in the light of the earlier Supreme
Court decisions to determine whether there has not in fact been
a departure from precedent.
As stated above, it was in the Boyd case that the Court first
coined the fourth and fifth amendments into rules of exclusion.
That case was one of forfeiture against the goods of an importer
charged with a violation of the Customs Act. The Act provided
for the compulsory production of the invoices of the defendant as
evidence against him, to show the value of the goods against
which forfeiture proceedings were brought, under penalty of a
decree of forfeiture pro confesso. The effect of the statute was
clearly to compel the production of the invoices of the defendant
as evidence against himself in a criminal proceeding, for a crim-
inal prosecution might later be instituted under the Act. The
section of the Act in question was therefore held to be in con-
travention to the fifth amendment to the Constitution. The en-
tire banc was agreed on that proposition; but a majority of the
court went further and consented to the following obiter dictum,
from which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Miller vigorously
dissented: ". . . The unreasonable searches and seizure con-
demned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for
the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against him-
self, which in criminal cases, is condemned in the fifth amend-
ment; and compelling a man in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself, which is condemned in the fifth amendment
throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable
search and seizure,' within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
" This conclusion was reached for the purpose of showing that the troop-
ers were not agents of the United States within the meaning of the Prohibi-
tion Act. One might speculate that possibly they were agents of the United
States within the meaning of and from the standpoint of the fourth and
fifth amendments to the Federal Constitution. But such a distinction seems
shadowy at best, even if the fact that it conflicts with previous cases be
left out of account. Compare Dodge v. United States (1926), 272 U. S. 530,
71 L. Ed. 892, 47 S. Ct. 191.
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of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to
be a witiiess against himself." This dictum very obviously re-
pudiated the doctrine that evidence is not affected by the illegal-
ity of the means by which the party obtained it.10
The principle underlying the dictum of the Boyd case became
a rule of law in Weeks v. United States. That was a prosecu-
tion for a Federal offense, using the mails to defraud-a subject
on which the state could not legislate. The defendant was ar-
rested by a State police officer, without a warrant, near his
place of employment in Kansas City. Other police officers had
gone to the defendant's house, and after searching among the
defendant's possessions, had taken certain papers, and articles
found there. Later in the same day police officers returned with
the United States marshal who, on searching among defend-
ant's belongings, carried away certain other letters and en-
velopes found in a drawer. Neither the marshal nor the police
had a search warrant. The defendant, before trial, filed a mo-
tion for return of the papers and letters, seized by the marshal,
but his petition was denied. Upon their introduction during the
trial, the defendant objected on the ground that the papers had
been obtained without a search warrant in violation of the
fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, which objection was overruled by the trial court. The
Government contended first, that thd letters having come into the
control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in
which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and
permit their use in evidence, and, second, that the court, when
engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice of the
manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of articles
of personal property which are material and properly offered in
evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trialjudge and held that the defendant's petition for the suppression
of the evidence should have been granted. The Court, in hold-
ing inadmissible evidence seized illegally by Federal officers for
Federal prosecutions, was much concerned with preventing the
reduction of the Constitutional provisions to a mere shadow.
The closing words of the opinion, which are very pertinent in
"With the exception of New Jersey and Iowa, all state constitutions
have provisions similar to the fourth and fifth amendments of the Federal
constitution: in those two states they are unwritten rules of constitutional
law and hence given similar force. But practically all state jurisdictions
adhere to the proposition that illegality of seizure affects only credibility
and not admissibility. This is frequently spoken of as the Massachusetts
rule, after a long line of decisions in that State beginning with Common-
wealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, a leading case on the subject. Missouri follows
the Federal rule. See State v. Rebasti (19 4), 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858.
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their bearing on the Gambino case, follow: "What remedies the
defendant may have against them (the police officers) we need
not inquire, as the fourth amendment is not directed to individ-
ual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Fed-
eral government and its agencies."' It is difficult to perceive
how the Gambino case is in accord with that limitation, consid-
ering the fact that no cooperation between the Federal agents
and the State troopers was alleged.
A corollary to the rule thus crystallized was pronounced in
Flagg v. United States12 about two years later. There, evidence
was excluded, though seized by municipal policemen, because the
court concluded that the police raid was directed by United
States officials who directly were responsible for the arrest and
the seizure. In the words of the court: "To attribute such an
elaborate and carefully prepared proceeding . . . to a few
local patrolmen . . . makes too severe a demand upon the
imagination."
But the degree of cooperation in that case is not at all com-
parable to the situation in the Gambino case, so as to give the
latter some support in the Flagg ruling. No cooperation be-
tween State troopers and Federal authorities was pleaded in the
principal case, and the only cooperation of which the Court tookjudicial notice was the Governor's proclamation (referred to
above) and the general conferences between prohibition direc-
tors and county sheriffs. But from the standpoint of paragraph
26 of title II of the National Prohibition Act their conference
would produce no legal consequence which differed from those
effected when a Federal officer urges private citizens to obey the
mandates of the law.8  Yet, in Burdeau v. McDowell,.4 the de-
fendant's conviction on a Federal charge was upheld even though
the evidence offered by the prosecution had been illegally seized,
where the seizure had been made by private individual. The
Court said: "The fourth amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous
cues, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation on other than governmental agencies." Un-
less one resorts to logic so fine-spun that it approaches legal
casuistry, the limitation of this excerpt, aside from one possible
explanation, cannot be reconciled with the Gambino ruling;
Italics the writer's.
(1916), 283 F. 481, 147 C. C. A. 367.
Dodge v. Unted States, supra.
Burdeau v. McDowell (1920), 256 U. S. 465, 65 L. Ed. 1048, 41 S. Ct.
574, 13 A. L. R. 1159.
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for so long as there was no cooperation between the State troop-
ers and national agents, it would follow that in contemplation
of the Federal courts acts done by the state officers with-
out color of authority were not different from the acts of
private persons spurred on to law enforcement by public
spirited citizens. The possible explanation referred to above
would involve scrapping that array of decisions beginning with
Barron v. Baltimore5 in which it was held that ". . the
fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of
the general government, not as applicable to the states," and
repudiating that long line of decisions beginning with Twining
v. New Jersey6 which provided a sort of anchor for the present
Federal rule on the subject.
Viewed from still another aspect, the same conclusion must be
reached. If the state of New York had never had a prohibition
law of its own, then certainly the Federal Government, being the
only one "interested" in enforcing the Volstead Act, could have
used in evidence liquor which the troopers had seized without
warrant and without cooperation of Federal authorities. 7 That
is the manner in which the rule has been universally applied.
And so in "dry" states like Kansas and New York before the re-
peal of the Mullat-Gage Act, evidence procured illegally by
State officers could be used in Federal prosecutions even though
the state courts would not permit its use.18 But the effect of the
Gambino decision is to provide that where a state statute and
national act have dealt with the same subject matter, a repeal
(1833), 7 Pet. 243.
(1908), 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. Ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14.
This conclusion rests on an interpretation of certain Supreme Court
holdings. Rowan v. United States, infra note 2, in which the United States
Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, permitted the use of evidence
seized by municipal officers in a Federal prosecution on which there was no
concurrent state legislation. United States v. Barber, infra note 24, ac-
cord. In the Weeks case, a prosecution for the unlawful use of the mails,
the Supreme Court in excluding evidence seized by the United States Mar-
shal, expressly approved the trial court's action in admitting the evidence
illegally seized by the local police.
"In Landwirth v. United States (1924), 299 F. 281, the court said: "It
must not be forgotten that the officers who made the search and seizure
were state officers and not officers of the United States. The fourth and
fifth amendments were designed to protect citizens from acts of oppression
on the part of officers of the United States. Even though the record dis-
closed an illegal search on the part of state officers . . . their evi-
dence, and evidence procured by them might have been received." In ar-
riving at this conclusion the court relied on the express wording of the
Weeks case. Accord, Coate v. United States (1923), 290 F. 134.
The court in Riggs v. United States (1924), 299 F. 273, said: ". ...
evidence procured by state officers by search and seizure without warrant
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/6
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of the state act, instead of re-establishing the common law on
the proposition, establishes the Federal act as an act of the
state; or it makes an act of the state have more force when re-
pealed than when in force; or it makes an interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States hinge on laws which state leg-
islatures, at their whim or caprice, might enact or repeal. Any
of the above "theories," is, of course, preposterous. Yet, if one
has the Burdeau and Weeks cases in mind, he would be bound to
accept one of these theories should he agree with the statement
of the Court that, "The conclusion here reached is not in conflict
with any of the earlier decisions of this court . .
It should be noted that there have been several instances in
which lower Federal courts have admitted the evidence under
facts analagous to those in the principal case, although the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in the principal case did not treat them
very seriously. Schroeder v. United States,19 for example, is, as
to facts, the parallel of the Gambino case, even to the point of
having arisen in New York after the repeal of the State prohibi-
tion act. The Court there said: ". . . In Twining v. New
Jersey . . . it was said that 'by the unvarying decisions of
this court the first ten amendments are restrictive only of na-
tional action.' . . It is true that there is no state Enforce-
ment Act in the state of New York; the Mullen-Gage Law having
been repealed. That fact, however, in our opinion, is quite im-
material. If all these local police officers did, had been done by
private citizens, acting without any color of authority, the re-
sult would not have been different." And upon the authority of
the latter quotation, the same court in Greenberg v. United
States20 and Katz v. United States2' reached the same conclusion.
Judge Rogers, who delivered the opinions in the above cases,
pointed out that they were not in the same category as the oft-
cited case of Flagg v. United States, dealt with above. In com-
menting on the latter case, Judge Rogers said, "There is noth-
ing in the [Flagg] opinion which indicated that the fourth and
fifth amendments have any application to searches made by local
police officers who act upon their own initiative and not upon
the instigation of Federal officials." And the defendants' pro-
cedure in the Schroeder and Gambino cases was the same.
Several other Federal cases show that the general understand-
ing as to the Federal rule was not that applied in the principal
may be introduced upon a trial in the Federal court, although the Federal
officers themselves would be inhibited from making search with or without
a warrant." Accord: Kanellos v. United States (1922), 282 F. 461, and
Thomas v. United States (1923), 290 F. 133.
(1925), 7 F. (2d) 60.
(1925), 7 F. (2d) 65.
(1925), 7 F. (2d) 67.
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case. Thus, in Rowan v. United States,22 for which the Supreme
Court denied a writ of certiorari, 23 it was held permissible for
the national government to make use of pertinent evidence
wrongfully obtained when it had no part in wrongfully obtain-
ing it. The evidence admitted in that case had been seized by
Dallas policemen in a prosecution under the United States Crim-
inal Code, the state of Texas having no statute regarding the
particular offense. United States v. Barber24 was a prosecution
under a Federal act for breaking into an interstate freight car, a
matter outside state control, and there the court held itself to
be without authority to order the return of the evidence insofar
as it had been seized by persons who were not Federal officers.
Consequently, unless one is going to permit a state statute to
influence rules of evidence in the Federal court-a doctrine to-
ward which the Supreme Court itself is not inclined-he cannot
but decide that the foregoing cases are in conflict with the Gain-
bino decision.
A Missouri case, State v. Rebasti,25 is quite similar to the prin-
cipal case in fact and holding. There defendant was arrested
by State officers, who, instead of obtaining a warrant to search
his private effects, turned the matter over to Federal authorities,
who illegally procured the evidence which was offered in the
State court. The Court excluded the evidence on the ground
that state courts must defend rights which a defendant has un-
der the Constitution of the United States, reasoning that "It is
unthinkable . . to say that the act of an officer, or of any
other individual is lawful or unlawful, not on account of the
character of the act, but on account of the court in which it is
called in question." That, no doubt, is good moralizing, but it
is contrary to every utterance which the Supreme Court of the
United States has made to the effect that the first ten amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions on the
powers of the state, but were intended to operate solely upon the
Federal Government. Likewise it overlooks that constitutional
truism that ours is a government having a division of powers,
each supreme in its own sphere of activity. The case had a
vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Blair, and has been the subject
of strong criticism.26
The foregoing review of Federal decisions tends to show that
(1922), 281 F. 137.
(1922), 260 U. S. 721, 67 L. Ed. 481, 43 S. Ct. 12.
(1923), 289 F. 523.
(1924), 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858.
See State v. Arregui (1927), Idaho, 254 P. 788, and Judge Hinton in 20
Ill. L. Rev. 76.
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in the Gambino case the Supreme Court either has repudiated
the limitations set down in the Weeks and Byars cases and the
basic conception underlying Twining v. New Jersey and cases
of like tenor, or has established a shaky foundation for deter-
mining the admissibility of evidence by making the instant deci-
sion turn on a distinction without meaning-the fact, namely,
that the State enforcement act had been repealed.
ABRAHAM E. MARGOLIN, '29.
ADJUDICATION OF PARTNERSHIP AS BANKRUPT UN-
DER VOLUNTARY PETITION IRRESPECTIVE OF
THE ADJUDICATION OF THE PARTNERS
The question of whether the adjudication of a partnership as
bankrupt necessarily adjudicates the members composing the
firm as bankrupts is one which has troubled the Federal courts
ever since they have been granted jurisdiction in bankruptcy,
with the result that there are two distinct lines of Federal cases.
Not until the recent decision of Liberty National Bank v. Bear'
did the Supreme Court of the United States definitely decide the
point, holding that the adjudication of the firm did not of itself
amount to an adjudication of the individual partners as bank-
rupt.
The question has always been a knotty one and its decision has
always hinged on whether the court recognized the partnership
as an entity or not. The very question of the entity of a part-
nership has troubled the common law courts ever since the idea
of partnership associations was conceived. Newman v. Eld-
ridge2 gives us the holding of the law merchant and the civil
law that a partnership is considered a legal entity distinct from
the individuals composing it. However, the common law for the
most part has recognized this entity,3 and for nearly all practical
purposes a partnership in the eyes of the common law is not an
entity, but merely a group of individuals.
In equity the situation is somewhat different and as illus-
trated by Farney v. Hauser et al.,4 the entity of a partnership
will be recognized for some purposes. Thus, in the marshalling
'(1928), 48 S. Ct. 252.
(1901), 107 La. 315, 31 So. 688.Flexner v. Farson, (1918), 248 U. S. 289, 63 L. Ed. 250, 39 S. Ct. 97;
In re Peck (1912), 206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258; Cutting v. Daigulau (1890),
151 Mass. 297, 23 N. E. 839; E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Jones
Bros. et al. (1912), 200 F. 638.
' (1921), 109 Kan. 75, 198 P. 178.
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